Competitiveness and labour regulations by Beccaría, Luis Alberto & Galín, Pedro
T E P II L 
¡ R E V I E W , 
N U M B E R 65 
A U G U S T 1 998 
S A N T I A G O , C H I L E 
O S C A R A L T I M I R 
Director of the Review 
E U G E N I O LAHERA 
Technical Secretary 
CEPAL REVIEW 65 
C O N T E N T S 
Income distribution, poverty and social expenditure In 
Latin America 
José Antonio Ocampo 
Military expenditure and development In Latin America 
Eugenio Lahera and Marcelo Ortúzar 
Growth, distributive justice and social policy 
Andrés Solimano 
Equity, foreign investment and international competitiveness 
Adolfo Figueroa 
Tensions in Latin American structural adjustment: 
allocation versus distribution 
Daniel M. Schydlowsky 
Competitiveness and labour regulations 
Luis Beccaria and Pedro Galin 
Latin American families: convergences and divergences in 
models and policies 
Irma Amagada 
Free trade agreements and female labour: the Chilean situation 
Alicia Frohmann and Pilar Romaguera 
Macroeconomic trends in Paraguay from 1989 to 1997: 
consumption bubble and financial crisis 
Stéphane Straub 
The strategies pursued by Mexican firms in their efforts 
to become global players 
Alejandra Salas-Porras 
Regulating the private provision of drinking water and 
sanitation services 
Terence R. Lee and Andrei S. Jouravlev 














Recent ECLAC publications 
A U G U S T 1998 
C E P A L R E V I E W 65 71 
Competitiveness 
and labour regulations 
Luis Bocearla 
Pedro Galin 
This article analyses the relations between the competitiveness 
of an economy and the labour regulations in force in it. It is 
argued that economic theory is not conclusive regarding the 
impact of labour regulations on competitiveness, since different 
schools of thought maintain opposing positions in many re-
spects. Moreover, empirical research has shown that the infor-
mation provided with respect to these assumed linkages is not 
very relevant Various policy consequences follow from this: 
countries have a variety of strategies at their disposal and 
greater leeway that is usually suggested, since many policies 
aimed at improving equity do not necessarily involve any re-
strictions on competitiveness. A country can therefore choose 
the desired level of social protection. The improvement of com-
petitiveness becomes, at least partly, a matter of income distri-
bution. The most conventional formula jproposes the reduction 
of workers' quality of life for a period whose duration is diffi-
cult to forecast, with the aim of providing enterprises with cer-
tain initial conditions which will allow them to make up for 
differences in productivity. This is not the only formula, how-
ever, nor is it the most equitable or effective. In order to gener-
ate those same conditions, income redistribution schemes can 
be designed which make investment for international competi-
tiveness attractive, without resorting to further erosion of the 
wages of those who were most seriously affected during the last 
years of application of the import substitution models. The 
analysis made suggests that there is ample leeway for choosing 
between various combinations of equity and efficiency, and 
their selection depends on the power relations of the various 
social actors and the structure of the State. 
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I 
Introduction 
Competitiveness and labour regulations, which are 
the main subjects of this article, relate to issues of 
great scope and enormous repercussions which go 
back a long way in history. 
It is not a question of the relations between two 
different sciences (such as economics and labour 
law),1 or between two facts, but between an eco-
nomic phenomenon -competitiveness- and labour 
law, understood here as positive law of broad scope 
(including social security). Labour regulations do not 
of course only involve costs: their main functions 
include the protection of both workers and produc-
tion, since they organize the latter and establish "in-
dustrial legality". Although this issue is dealt with 
here from an interdisciplinary standpoint, it should be 
noted that whereas there are an enormous number of 
studies on this matter in the economic literature, 
there are only a few quite isolated contributions 
dealing with labour law. 
With regard to the antiquity of this matter, it may 
be recalled that in the debate over laws to limit the 
working day it was frequently argued that these 
would ruin the industries of any country which 
adopted them, because of international competition 
from those which did not apply such rules. The pre-
amble to the Constitution of the International Labour 
Organisation declares that "Whereas also the failure 
of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is 
an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire 
to improve the conditions in their own countries", 
and the original British proposal for the formation of 
the ILO stated that one of the main objectives of the 
new organization was to do away with competition 
based on sub-human working conditions.2 The cur-
rent debates and arguments also contain reminders of 
some quite far-off controversies: a recent publication 
reproduced an article originally published in 1927, 
• A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the LX 
Jornadas Rioplatenses de Derecho de Trabajo y de la Seguridad 
Social (Punta del Este, 11-12 May 1996). 
1
 tt would appear that labour law has not escaped an onslaught 
"such as has not been seen since the 1890s: a deliberate ten-
dency to impose the monopoly of economic method on all 
studies of society", as Adam Przeworsky noted a decade ago 
(Przeworsky, 1987, p. 97). 
which it included in order to show that the present 
economic problems are not totally different from 
those which existed then.3 
The repercussions of this matter are not exclu-
sively academic. On the contrary, it involves the in-
terests and positions of various social and political 
forces and States, with differing interpretations of the 
values of social justice, protectionism, international 
competition and even the preservation of civilization. 
The most heated international debates are currently 
about the "social clauses" or the so-called social di-
mensions of the liberalization of international trade: a 
matter which warrants a specific study on it and will 
therefore not be dealt with here. 
These three features: the broad scope, antiquity 
and importance of the issue, make it necessary to 
limit the objectives of this study: we will set forth 
here what is currently known about the matter with-
out pretending to make original contributions or 
substantive empirical additions to the existing body 
of knowledge. 
The layout of the article will be as follows: 
section II will set forth the main approaches of eco-
nomic theory, often stylized both in order to save 
space and for institutional reasons: there will be no 
econometric expositions, which would be long and 
tedious for the present context. Section III sets forth 
the most recent arguments put forward in the specific 
debate on labour regulations. The effects of such 
regulations, as indicated by empirical studies, are 
dealt with in section IV, which also includes the most 
salient aspects of the way in which this matter is 
being dealt with in Argentina. Finally, section V sets 
out some final reflections. 
With regard to the sources, most of the contribu-
tions come from the economic literature, since there 
are few legal studies on this matter.4 
2
 Cited by Caire, 1994. 
3
 The 1927 article was by Herbert Feis, reproduced in 
Sengerberger and Campbell, eds., 1994, pp. 29-55. 
4
 In the Argentine legal literature we only found two articles: 
those by Armando Caro Figueroa, 1992, p. 383 et seq., and 
Geraldo von Potobsky, 1995. 
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II 
Economic theory and State intervention 
This section briefly sets forth the basic economic ar-
guments on State intervention, in order to provide a 
frame of reference for more specific consideration of 
the impact of labour regulations on competitiveness. 
With regard to State intervention, conventional 
neoclassical thinking asserts that the market -if al-
lowed to operate without interference- ensures 
achievement of the greatest possible well-being of 
the population. It does, however, offer two justifica-
tions for State intervention: on the one hand, the 
presence of market flaws such as the existence of 
monopolies, oligopolies, monopsonies or oligopsonies, 
externalities, lack of information, or the fact that pub-
lic or free goods are involved, and on the other hand, 
the need to change income distribution when the re-
sult of the free play of the markets is considered to be 
unsuitable. In reality, it concerns interventions seek-
ing to move the economy from one optimal state (op-
timal from the point of view of efficiency) to another. 
Neoclassical economists point out, however, that 
State action does not always improve aggregate well-
being even when there are market flaws or distribu-
tion is manifestly inequitable. Thus, for example, it is 
usually argued that many interventions based on the 
objective of redistribution do not keep the system on 
the leading edge of its potential but bring it to points 
which are below that level, thus causing a reduction 
in global efficiency. Actions based on the existence 
of market flaws are also open to question because 
there may be "government flaws", especially as pub-
lic interventions are designed mainly in the light of 
the objectives of politicians or bureaucrats, thus lead-
ing to losses of efficiency greater than those deriving 
from the presence of externalities, public goods or 
monopolies.5 
Neoclassical authors assert that in a dynamic 
context State interference leads to unsuitable re-
source allocation which affects the growth capacity 
of the economy by reducing the profitability of in-
vestments, discouraging saving or giving signals 
which lead to a reduction of investment in the activi-
5
 According to Self (1993), neoclassical authors lay frequent 
stress on the many opportunities that bureaucrats have to distort 
policy objectives for their own benefit. 
ties with the greatest growth potential. Furthermore, 
in an open economy State intervention is also alleged 
to alter the structure of incentives, thus diverting 
many investments towards branches which have 
fewer advantages and thereby causing inefficient 
resource use, lowering the global competitiveness 
of the economy and reducing its growth capacity. 
The criticisms of these basic postulates of neo-
classical thinking made by heterodox neoclassical 
authors or those who do not support this school of 
thought are located on two levels of analysis. On the 
one hand, there are conceptual differences regarding 
the impact of regulations and institutions on eco-
nomic efficiency, and on the other hand there are 
controversies about empirical questions regarding the 
very existence of certain market flaws or the quanti-
tative impact that various kinds of intervention can 
have on efficiency. 
With regard to the conceptual discussion, it is 
stressed that certain institutions have a positive im-
pact on efficiency, and it has also been asserted that 
prices do not only constitute a signal for the alloca-
tion of resources but also influence the quality of the 
product. In these circumstances, the free play of the 
market does not always automatically achieve opti-
mal results (Stiglitz, 1987). There may also be possi-
ble conflicts between the short term (inefficient 
resource allocation) and the long term (increased 
productivity). Protectionist trade policies were justi-
fied precisely on the basis of the infant industry 
argument or, in more general terms, the need to 
"create" competitive advantages. 
Another idea which is in opposition to the ortho-
dox view is that the economic determining factors 
leave a more or less broad margin for the actors in-
volved -buyers or sellers, workers and entrepreneurs-
to negotiate levels of prices and quantities without 
this adversely affecting efficiency. This means that in 
all cases buyers and sellers have some bargaining 
power, thus making necessary various institutions to 
regulate exchanges and balance the natural differ-
ences in the competitiveness of the actors. 
With regard to the discussion about the very 
existence of market flaws, neo-Keynesian thinking 
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holds that many of them -such as the capacity to 
exercise some degree of control over the market- are 
very important and prevent adjustment to optimal 
levels. With regard to the appraisal of the distortions 
In the preceding section we briefly reviewed the po-
sitions of neoclassical economists -and also of some 
schools of thought which are critical of this orthodox 
view- on State intervention in general. In this section 
we will concentrate specifically on the development 
of the different analytical approaches regarding la-
bour regulations. 
The archetypal expressions of the orthodox view 
in this respect are, with regard to supply, that any 
programme which protects the population from the 
consequences of unemployment gives an incentive 
not to work at all and is a hindrance for the economy, 
and with regard to demand, that social assistance 
changes employment decisions in a socially ineffi-
cient manner (Blank and Freeman, 1994). 
From the orthodox perspective, unemployment 
benefit programmes or social security benefits can 
lead workers to prefer idleness to work until such 
benefits run out; this increases the well-being of the 
beneficiaries, but reduces the global social product 
and prolongs unemployment. Programmes which es-
tablish compulsory social benefits may constrain 
workers' choices, leading to suboptimal and ineffi-
cient results and higher labour costs. Generous sick-
ness benefits can lead to an epidemic of headaches, 
backaches and similar ills until the coverage of sick 
leave is completely used up. 
In terms of the demand for labour, it is considered 
that regulations limiting the hiring or firing of workers, 
for example, can distort the labour market signals and 
reduce profitability because of over-manning or else 
cause employers to take on fewer workers in expecta-
tion of higher future costs. Laws which impose taxes on 
employers to finance retirement pensions or unemploy-
ment benefits may cause firms to under-declare the 
wages actually paid or may make it uneconomic to hire 
low-income workers, depending on the rate of such 
taxes. Legally fixed minimum wages may reduce 
employment in low-wage activities or occupations. 
that regulation might cause, a number of studies have 
shown that some of its costs in terms of inefficiency 
are not significant compared with its clear positive 
impact on income distribution. 
This approach emphasizes the distorting effects 
exerted on saving and investment by the taxes needed 
to finance such programmes. These programmes, it is 
claimed, divert capital away from more fruitful in-
vestment options and hence, if the latter options had 
greater potential for job creation, the money spent on 
sustaining low-income families could lead to a per-
manent reduction in job opportunities, leaving those 
families, like the rest of society, in worse conditions 
in the long run. Many such programmes expand 
public sector employment, thus further strengthening 
labour market rigidities. 
Finally, the orthodox approach claims that in an 
open economy there is a further adverse impact if 
social protection programmes have any of the nega-
tive effects mentioned above, because by increasing 
labour costs, protective legislation may reduce inter-
national competitiveness. We shall return to this 
point later. 
The opponents of the orthodox neoclassical 
school, who base their views, as we already noted, 
on various different theories, formulate a number 
of reservations regarding approaches like those 
reviewed above. 
Firstly, they highlight the role of social protec-
tion programmes in increasing human capital and 
productivity in the labour market. According to this 
viewpoint, labour regulations can create long-term 
incentives for investment in training (Blank and 
Freeman, 1994; Standing, 1992; Boyer, 1994). If there 
are restrictions on the dismissal of workers, there is 
an inducement for employers to invest more in train-
ing the labour force, since these laws give rise to 
long-term relationships which make investment in 
specific training a profitable proposition. 
In other respects, long-term links may give rise 
to higher productivity of workers through, for 
example, their identification with the aims of the 
enterprise and their loyalty to it. 
Ill 
Labour regulations 
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The theory of "efficiency wages" also provides 
various arguments in favour of the beneficial effects 
of equitable treatment of workers. According to this 
approach, wages are not just an allocation mecha-
nism but also a means for promoting the efficiency of 
the labour force. Consequently, preventing wage 
rates from going down too much would have a posi-
tive effect on productivity. Some versions of this ap-
proach, in particular, see wage-earners' attitudes in a 
different light from the neoclassical approach: work-
ers do not try to reduce the effort needed to carry out 
their tasks -a view which is implicit in the idea that 
this effort reduces the individual's own gain- but 
always make a given effort, which can be influ-
enced by the remuneration they receive: workers 
who consider themselves to be fairly treated will 
assuredly work harder (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, 
p. 45). 
Minimum wages, which have been criticized, as 
already noted, on the grounds that they reduce the 
demand for less skilled workers, are considered to 
have a possibly beneficial effect on efficiency by in-
creasing the supply of such groups. 
Furthermore, orthodox arguments about the dis-
torting effects of regulations usually take as their 
frame of reference a situation of perfect competition, 
without analysing the global economic context, in 
which there are market flaws and other regulations. 
An example of this is the British legislation on equal 
pay adopted in the early 1970s: in contradiction of 
neoclassical theories, there is no proof that the rela-
tive increase in women's wages brought about by this 
law has been reflected in any reduction in female 
employment, which may be due to the fact that the 
paradigm of perfect competition did not fully apply 
and employers exerted some degree of control over 
the market. In this context, the law made it possible 
to increase overall efficiency (Gregg, Machin and 
Manning, 1994, p. 109). 
From a more empirical standpoint, some hetero-
dox authors note that although protective regulations 
do have distorting effects on labour markets, no 
measurement is made of the benefits that they bring, 
which are in any case difficult to quantify (Blank and 
Freeman, 1994, pp. 31 and 32; Sengerberger and 
Campbell (eds.), 1994, pp. 13-14; Standing, 1992). 
The economic benefits of labour regulations -some 
of which were already mentioned earlier- are indi-
rect, hidden, intangible, spread over time and not lo-
calized (Boyer, 1994, p. 26). Mention has been made 
in this respect of the example of the costs imposed by 
regulations on health and safety, which are generally 
easy to estimate, as are some of the benefits they 
generate (saving of outlays on the treatment and re-
placement of workers injured in accidents, for exam-
ple), which may exceed such costs. It is more 
difficult to estimate the loss of productivity and pur-
chasing power and the total amounts lost in some 
recent very costly industrial accidents (Sengerberger 
and Campbell (eds.), 1994), not to mention human 
values which cannot be measured in economic terms, 
such as life and health. Many of these phenomena 
also generate negative externalities which are gener-
ally hard to calculate. In order to make a full cost-
benefit analysis of each social programme, it is 
necessary to compare the increase in the economic 
well-being of citizens with the direct and indirect 
costs involved. A mere demonstration of the distort-
ing effects or the costs in terms of inefficiency is not 
enough (Blank and Freeman, 1994, p. 32). 
This latter observation also points up the fact 
that orthodox arguments generally fail to take into 
account the effect of protective rules and institutions 
on income distribution. Institutions like trade unions 
not only play an important role from the point of 
view of efficiency, by reducing transaction costs, but 
also tend to offset the natural difference in bargaining 
capacity between workers and employers. Indeed, 
insofar as employers recognize a certain amount 
of power of the market, as noted in a previous 
paragraph, trade unions increase rather than reduce 
efficiency. 
Heterodox thinkers maintain that the assertion 
that labour regulations or social programmes reduce 
economic growth is weak even in terms of orthodox 
economic theory. The analyses indicate a loss of effi-
ciency in static terms, but not a reduction in growth 
rates. Growth theory does not provide any clear pre-
dictions on how static distortions alter the rate of 
economic development. Indeed, in line with various 
arguments mentioned above, short-term inefficien-
cies can be offset by dynamic efficiency. 
Some specific comments on the subject of com-
petitiveness are called for in concluding this section. 
Competitiveness does not depend only on efficiency 
or relative productivity. A country can flood another 
nation with goods that it produces less efficiently if 
the difference in the prices of the inputs and factors 
that enter into their production is greater than the 
difference in the efficiency with which those inputs 
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or factors are used.6 From an aggregate standpoint, 
this means that a country can be "competitive" on the 
basis of low wages. Consequently, lower competi-
tiveness does not always mean less chance of com-
peting, but a lower standard of living. 
The orthodox approach holds that the relative 
decline in productivity may only give rise to a tem-
porary reduction in competitiveness, because the 
market mechanisms cause a drop in wages and/or 
other factor prices (exports go down and/or imports 
go up, thus leading to a drop in production and em-
ployment) which tends to restore competitiveness. As 
this self-regulating mechanism is felt to be partially 
impeded by the existence of labour regulations, it is 
proposed that these should be reduced: this would 
reduce wage costs, thereby improving competitive-
IV 
Empirical data 
Now that we have briefly set forth the theoretical 
arguments regarding the incidence of labour regula-
tions on competitiveness, it is worth looking at the 
empirical data adduced in support of the respective 
positions. Generally speaking, the data have been 
prepared in the light of the differences between the 
behaviour of the developed countries, particularly 
those of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), on the one hand, and the 
countries of the South, on the other. 
A general assertion may be made at this point 
which serves to sum up the conclusions of this sec-
tion: when we analyse the arguments on the relations 
between social protection programmes, labour market 
flexibility and aggregate economic well-being, we 
see that very little information is available on numer-
ous questions (Blank and Freeman, 1994, p. 36). 
1. The industrialized countries 
With regard to the developed world, comparisons 
have been made between, on the one hand, the Euro-
6
 The greater competitiveness displayed by a given activity is 
not due solely to its greater efficiency and/or the lower prices 
prevailing in it. It may also be due to the lower prices paid for 
inputs (whose production may be very efficient and/or involves 
the payment of low factor prices) or for consumer goods (which 
means that wages can be lower). 
ness and making the activities in question more at-
tractive to investments, and this would lead in time to 
a rise in productivity and -in a context of growing 
employment- in wages too. 
The heterodox criticisms of this approach point 
out, firstly, that the improvement in competitiveness 
based on lower wages: i) leads to the abandonment of 
the quest for increased efficiency; ii) encourages spe-
cialization in relatively simple goods which require 
relatively unskilled labour and usually have little fu-
ture; and iii) does not really constitute a strategy, 
since it cannot be repeated and its effects are over-
taken by the increases in productivity in other coun-
tries. Secondly, they question, on the grounds already 
mentioned earlier, the orthodox idea that deregulation 
and lower wages favour increased productivity. 
pean economies -especially those of the European 
Union- which have extensive regulations and social 
protection machinery, and on the other the United 
States, where social security benefits and labour 
regulations are notably looser. The analysis has often 
also been extended to Japan, which has stricter la-
bour regulations and social protection systems than 
the United States, although the level of collective 
bargaining is decentralized. 
In principle, the orthodox school considers the 
United States as a model country in terms of com-
petitiveness because of its limited regulations, 
whereas the European Community is seen as repre-
senting the opposite. 
The most systematic study made by the ortho-
dox school is probably that which analyses the be-
haviour of the OECD countries which have signed 
regional trade agreements: i.e., the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), made up of the Scandinavian 
countries, Switzerland and Austria, and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).7 This 
study analyses the regulations and provisions regard-
ing working hours, contracts, minimum wages and 
rights of representation of workers and concludes 
In reality, Mexico is not analysed for lack of information. 
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that there is no single direct relation between labour 
regulations and trade results, but that it is too soon to 
draw a final conclusion in this respect and that more 
empirical research is needed (OECD, 1995). A more 
recent study by the same organization (OECD, 1996) 
mentions the difficulties encountered in trying to 
make an empirical analysis of the links between basic 
labour standards and trade flows, the main limitation 
being the fact that the available information on basic 
standards is limited and incomplete, except with re-
gard to freedom of association and collective bar-
gaining. The conclusions of the study therefore refer 
mainly to the latter two basic standards. The empiri-
cal data confirm the analytical results whereby basic 
labour standards have hardly any influence on trade 
performance. The idea of sinking to a lowest com-
mon denominator in the sense that countries with me-
diocre standards win portions of the export market at 
the expense of those with good standards is not con-
firmed by empirical observation. According to the 
conclusions of this study, the developing countries 
have no empirical justification for believing that an 
improvement in basic labour standards would ad-
versely affect their economic performance or com-
petitiveness in world markets. 
This skepticism about correlations between pro-
tective regulations and productivity is shared by 
other international organizations. Thus, an official 
ILO document asserts that the theoretical advantages 
of open, decentralized competition in the labour mar-
kets must be contrasted with the fact that three of the 
world's most successful economies- the United 
States, Japan and Germany- have vastly different 
systems of wage fixing, union density, levels of ne-
gotiation and forms of coordination of the whole 
economy. The most elementary conclusion is that 
such disparities do not count as far as global employ-
ment and other macroeconomic variables are con-
cerned (ILO, 1995). Several documents of different 
tones have been prepared in the European Commis-
sion. One of them states that there is general agree-
ment that the labour markets do not work well and 
that the origin of the rigidities observed is the lack of 
flexibility of the labour market, especially from the 
point of view of the organization of working time, 
wages and mobility (European Commission, 1994a). 
In another official document, however, the "general 
agreement" on this matter is questioned and it is 
noted that there are those who argue that excessively 
restrictive labour regulations entail costs that reduce 
the competitiveness of firms in one country or region 
compared with others. On the other hand, many ex-
perts believe that productivity and high labour stand-
ards have always been an integral part of the 
competitive formula. The tension between these two 
points of view has been very evident and it must be 
admitted that there is no clear agreement on this 
point (European Commission, 1994b). A study pub-
lished by the United Nations.Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) states that there is no 
empirical information to support or deny the claim 
that loose labour rights give a competitive advantage 
in trade, so that studies in greater depth need to be 
carried out on each of the labour standards in 
question (De Castro, 1995, pp. 9 and 10). 
Nor are there any studies which provide conclu-
sive data in this respect in the academic field. At the 
Fourth European Regional Congress of the Interna-
tional Industrial Relations Association the main topic 
was the competitive advantages of European, United 
States and Japanese industrial relations, and the offi-
cial report noted that the documents prepared were 
marked by cautious attitudes and reserved judgments 
with regard to the advantages and potential develop-
ment of the European, Japanese and United States 
blocs. According to those documents, none of the 
properties behind those three great world blocs was 
generally superior to its competitors, since each 
of them had its relative merits and disadvantages 
(Jacobi, 1994, p. 18). Another study highlights the 
complexity of the subject and the "over-simplifica-
tion" displayed by the various interpretations, al-
though in some cases certain labour regulations, such 
as the extremely rigid Italian regulations on hiring or 
the lack of regulations to protect job security in the 
United States, may be associated with a loss of global 
economic efficiency (Buechtemann, 1993, p. 62). 
Other studies note that although the United States 
-the industrialized country with the most flexible la-
bour regulations and the lowest degree of social pro-
tection- has had the highest productivity in the world 
for a number of decades, it will lose that leading 
position towards the year 2000 and be overtaken by' 
France and Belgium, since its productivity growth 
rate is below that of the OECD countries, except for 
Australia and the Netherlands (Freeman, 1994, p. 9). 
Nor are categorical conclusions reached in a com-
parative study of five industrialized countries (the 
United States, France, Great Britain, Germany and 
Sweden) on competitiveness and the Welfare State, 
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since it is noted that while lack of economic disci-
pline can cause the Welfare State to be at odds with 
competitiveness in terms of prices, productivity and 
quality are nevertheless benefited by it (Pfaller, 
Gough and Therborn (eds.), 1993, p. 368 et seq.). In 
another more recent study it is asserted that both the 
theory and the empirical data give few reasons for 
believing that differences in labour regulations make 
a significant contribution to differences in production 
costs and, hence, to investment and trade patterns.8 
In the light of the wide range of studies exam-
ined, it may be suggested that there is no empirical 
information which backs up the existence of linkages 
between labour standards and competitiveness, even 
with regard to the general direction in which those 
linkages operate. 
2. The developing countries 
It has been hotly argued that liberalization of the la-
bour market is an essential feature in the structural 
adjustment programmes that the developing countries 
need to apply in order to stimulate the economy and 
successfully integrate it into the world market by im-
proving its competitiveness. This orthodox approach 
maintains that over-regulation of the labour market in 
Latin America has both entrenched labour market 
dualism between a highly protected urban formal 
sector and a largely unprotected informal sector and 
has impeded labour market adjustment to changing 
market forces. In contrast, it is argued that labour 
markets are only sparsely regulated in the recently 
industrialized Asian countries and that this has been 
an essential factor behind the successful implemen-
tation of export-led development strategies. It is 
also claimed that the repression of trade unions 
-especially in their wage-setting role- has con-
tributed to this (ILO, 1995, p. 93). 
Followers of the heterodox school of thought, 
however, have claimed that in the light of these re-
pressive interventions it is rather ingenuous to expect 
that price distortions can be avoided in successful 
cases of industrial growth (Standing, 1992, p. 26). It 
has also been said that the repression of trade unions 
was not completely generalized (Hong Kong re-
8
 K. Anderson, The entwining of trade policy with environmental 
and labour standards, paper presented at the World Bank con-
ference on the Uruguay Round and the developing economies 
(26-27 January 1995), quoted by De Castro, 1995, p. 10. 
spected British liberal traditions, yet its economic 
performance was as successful as that of the other 
"tigers")- In Singapore and Taiwan, a different 
manner of intervention in the trade unions was used: 
they were kept under control through a single party. 
Thanks to its participation in the National Wages 
Council, the trade union movement in Singapore has 
been able to exert some influence on economic and 
social policies, within admittedly narrow limits. At 
all events, along with the intervention in the 1970s 
which was aimed at restricting wage rises to keep 
them below GDP growth, wage correction policies 
were adopted to tackle the shortage of labour and 
encourage firms to enter into more technologically 
complex activities. 
The question has been raised of whether these 
labour market control systems in Southeast Asia 
were really necessary for those countries' competi-
tive success. As the World Bank itself notes, gener-
ally speaking workers are more willing to accept 
wage flexibility when there is a rapid upward trend, 
because a downward adjustment only means a slower 
rate of increase rather than an absolute reduction in 
real labour income.9 In other words, the constant rise 
in real wages observed in the "Asian Tigers" would 
appear to have facilitated the generalized acceptance 
of flexible wages even though their rate of increase 
has been lower than that of productivity. At the same 
time, the degree of State intervention in the economy 
was very intense, with very active industrial policies 
of a coercive nature which may have had a much 
more decisive influence on the economic success 
than deregulation of the labour market or, more ex-
actly, its repressive or paternalist regulation, as noted 
by Standing (1992, p. 38). It has been asserted that 
one of the most important features of South Korea's 
economic development is probably the strong role of 
the State, especially in its capacity to influence and 
discipline the great companies which dominate the 
Korean economy (Park, 1994a, p. 209). It has also 
been asserted that what enabled the East Asian coun-
tries to discipline their companies was the relative 
weakness of both the industrial and the agricultural 
groups at the beginning of the post-war industrial de-
velopment process.10 
9
 G. Fields, "Changing labor market conditions and economic 
development in Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan", in World Bank Economic Review, vol. 8, No. 3, 
quoted in ILO, 1995, p. 95. 
10
 A. Amsden, "A theory of government intervention in late 
industrialization", cited by Hikino and Amsden, 1995, p. 6. 
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Finally, the growing incorporation of protective 
institutions -the minimum wage in South Korea 
and Taiwan, and unemployment insurance in South 
Korea- and the growing independence of the trade 
union movement do not seem to have altered the 
growth rates of these countries. "These policy devel-
opments in Asia thus highlight the fact that neither a 
totally deregulated labour market nor labour repres-
sion is indispensable for success in export markets" 
(ILO, 1995). 
Other views even question whether State inter-
vention in South Korea has been exclusively repres-
sive and consider that it is necessary to take into 
account the important paternalist elements in labour 
policies over the last 30 years. In order to gain com-
petitiveness in international markets, labour was ex-
tensively regulated by the government. This did not 
necessarily mean, however, that the intervention in 
the labour market was aimed exclusively at benefit-
ting employers. In order to prevent exploitation of 
workers in view of the absence of (collective) labour 
rights, the government took a number of protective 
measures and even encouraged employers to improve 
working conditions as far as was compatible with the 
degree of economic development (Park, 1994b). A 
World Bank study has noted that the South Korean 
government intervened to ensure that wages did not 
increase faster than productivity, but that, at the same 
time, workers shared in the fruits of growth (Mazum-
dar, 1994). Although trade union autonomy was re-
stricted, the revisions of labour legislation in the 
early 1960s strengthened individual protection. In 
spite of the severe repression of collective rights, the 
revisions of the labour legislation in 1970 included 
some measures to increase workers' well-being, and 
in 1981 a number of measures were taken to improve 
health and safety regulations. An analysis of the his-
tory of labour legislation shows that the State contin-
ued to increase protection of individual labour 
relations, while at the same time reducing the legal 
provisions protecting collective relations. Since 1965, 
real wages have grown at a cumulative annual rate 
of 7.5%, which surpassed the performance of all the 
industrialized countries, including Japan, in periods 
of rapid growth. Income distribution also improved 
substantially, becoming more equal, and the share of 
wage earners' income in total national income rose 
from 31.8% in 1965 to 59.7% in 1990. Although the 
South Korean working day is the longest and the 
incidence of accidents is the highest among all the 
countries supplying data to the ILO's Labour Statistics 
Yearbook, the length of the working day has gone 
down significantly since 1980, and with regard to 
accidents, these are said to be recorded more fully 
than in other countries (Park, 1994b). 
In more general terms, a strong correlation has 
been found, in a sub-sample of recently industrialized 
countries, between equality of income distribution and 
productivity growth (Hikino and Amsden, 1995, p. 17). 
The orthodox argument is well known in Latin 
America: by altering the relative returns of the vari-
ous sectors, tariff barriers and the high degree of 
State involvement are supposed to have given rise to 
economies with little growth capacity and/or serious 
macroeconomic instability. Labour legislation, in 
particular, is supposed to have deprived the labour 
market of flexibility, increased non-wage costs and, 
in some cases, excessively increased the capacity of 
the unions to exert pressures. This, it is alleged, ex-
plains a level of wage costs which is not in keeping 
with the productivity achieved, thus adversely affect-
ing the competitiveness of those economies and then-
capacity to generate productive employment. This is 
reflected, it is claimed, in a high degree of under-
utilization of labour which is manifested in the high 
proportion of informal workers; the resulting seg-
mentation is said to largely explain the unequal per-
sonal income distribution, and the low rates of 
growth of production and generation of employment 
have meant that in the long term the share of wages 
in national income was not able to increase. 
Comparative studies made in the Latin American 
context, however, share the general skepticism about 
the conclusiveness of the available information. 
Thus, it has been asserted in a World Bank study that 
if, for example, the relatively successful adjustment 
of Costa Rica is contrasted with the problems en-
countered by Bolivia, it is clear that the dismantiing 
of labour institutions is neither necessary (Costa 
Rica) nor sufficient (Bolivia) to ensure that an adjust-
ment has satisfactory results. It is added that in future 
studies it would be useful to analyse the role of 
labour institutions, trade unions and economic policy 
before embarking on a global defence of the dis-
mantling of such institutions (Horton, Kanbur and 
Mazumdar, 1994, pp. 45 and 57). 
From a different standpoint, it has been asserted, 
on the basis of an analysis of the labour protection 
systems of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Argentina, 
Chile, Brazil and Uruguay, that it is by no means 
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clear that labour legislation has any clear effects on 
overall industrial productivity and that the principle 
underlying the present policy proposals of a number 
of Latin American countries -namely, that it is suffi-
cient to make the regulations on dismissal and labour 
contracts more flexible in order to improve the eco-
nomic results- is based on a serious misconception 
(Marshall, 1994, pp. 76-77). 
An even more recent study seeks to establish 
whether reduction of labour costs is necessary in or-
der to improve competitiveness. The analysis con-
centrates on the evolution of the manufacturing 
sector over the period 1990-1995 in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. It is concluded that 
although labour costs rose in four of the five coun-
tries studied, productivity rose even more. This 
shows that labour costs are not an impediment to 
higher competitiveness, since the evolution of the lat-
ter is determined more by labour productivity than by 
labour costs. The study concludes that the increase in 
labour costs measured at international prices -which 
could have affected competitiveness- was due 
mainly to macroeconomic policies which have estab-
lished overvalued exchange rates with respect to the 
dollar and hence alterations in relative prices to the 
detriment of primary and industrial goods. This has 
meant that the increase in such labour costs for em-
ployers in the tradeable goods sector has not neces-
sarily been reflected in proportional improvements in 
the real wages of workers. Industrial wages grew 
over the period in question, but at the end of it they 
were lower than in 1980 in Argentina (-21%), 
Mexico (-38%) and Peru (-57%), while they were 
10% higher in Brazil and 29% higher in Chile 
(Tokman and Martinez, 1995). In other words, there 
is no conclusive evidence of an association between 
labour legislation (expressed as total labour costs) 
and competitiveness, since the decisive variables are 
of a different nature. 
In short, the information available from the stud-
ies on Southern countries is not conclusive with re-
gard to a possible relation between labour institutions 
and competitiveness: both World Bank studies and 
those of the n,o question the simplistic approaches 
which directly associate deregulation or absence of 
rules with competitive advantages. At all events, 
more research is needed to clarify the complex inter-
relations among the host of variables which deter-
mine competitiveness, not only in the short term but 
even more so in the long term, as the studies on 
South Korea suggest. 
3. Argentina 
The proposal to abandon the accumulation model 
based on import substitution and adopt a system in-
volving greater exposure to international competition 
was originally part of the economic proposals made a 
few days after the 1976 coup d'état It was only from 
1991 onwards, however, that a broad programme was 
put into effect which enlarged on some trends already 
identified years before and made substantial changes 
in the rules regarding trade and financial relations 
with the rest of the world and the State's role in the 
economy. 
In this context, labour regulations become merely 
one particular element in the broader question of 
State intervention. The orthodox view is that these 
regulations impose high production costs and disin-
centives for investment which have adversely affected 
the competitiveness of the production apparatus. The 
elimination or adaptation of labour market regula-
tions should therefore form part of a more general 
adaptation of the framework of rules which was es-
sential in order to put Argentina in its proper place in 
world markets. 
In particular, it was stated that non-wage costs 
were high compared with other countries of the re-
gion, with the Southeast Asian nations, and even with 
some industrialized economies. In a comparative 
study of the situation of the MERCOSUR countries, it is 
noted that total labour costs exceed gross wages by 
39% in Argentina, 23% in Chile and 52% in Brazil 
(FIEL, 1992). This greater burden of indirect wages is 
explained by the high payroll taxes to finance social 
security and other regulations such as family allow-
ances, unemployment insurance or severance pay. 
Negotiated wages and strong trade unions were 
also blamed for the fact that wages were high and 
have not responded to the situation of the labour mar-
ket or levels of productivity. For example, in almost 
all the activities covered by the HEL study, gross 
wages in Argentina were between 10% and 20% (or 
even more in some cases) higher than in Chile and 
Brazil. 
Some regulations, such as those relating to dis-
missal, not only involve high average costs but also, 
since they are of a contingent nature, increase uncer-
tainty and investment risks. It is also claimed that 
regulations on dismissal reduce the flexibility of the 
labour market. Consequently, it is claimed that these 
regulations were not only a factor in the high labour 
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costs at the beginning of the period following the 
adoption of convertibility, but also had a negative 
effect on the capacity to improve production effi-
ciency. It was claimed that the main way of reducing 
unit labour costs should be sought with respect to two 
very closely related aspects: making labour condi-
tions more flexible and increasing the productivity 
per employee (BOUT, 1995, pp. 196-197). The argu-
ment would therefore be that greater external flexi-
bility is associated with higher productivity. 
Orthodox analysts have therefore repeatedly pro-
posed the reduction of costs and more flexible regu-
lations as means of instantaneously improving 
competitiveness and allowing productivity to im-
prove on an ongoing basis. They also maintain that 
this would bring down the relative price of labour 
and make possible more dynamic growth of employ-
ment for a given level of growth of production. 
The increase in unemployment -a tendency ob-
served even before the international crisis of late 
1994- was identified by some analysts as evidence 
of the effects of the rigidity and high costs deriving 
from labour regulations. During the early years of the 
period following the adoption of convertibility, how-
ever, production, productivity and exports all ex-
panded. Even though there was a significant increase 
in imports, it cannot be argued that the regulations 
have been a serious obstacle which has prevented 
firms from adjusting to the new conditions. It has 
been asserted, however, that the increase in industrial 
productivity was largely due to a "defensive" strat-
egy on the part of firms (Kosacoff, 1993, pp. 50-55) 
and that there was not a significant generalized flow 
of investments seeking to take advantage of the new 
rules. It was suggested that this could be explained 
by the high initial labour costs, which made tradeable 
goods activities uncompetitive and hence unattractive 
to investors. It should be borne in mind, however, 
that the high relative labour costs registered in Ar-
gentina in the early years following the adoption of 
convertibility were largely the consequence of the 
real exchange rate level. Thus, as may be seen from 
table 1, which includes data on industry, labour costs 
in dollars were high, but real wages continued to 
stand at historically depressed levels (although higher 
than in the years of hyperinflation). As occurred in 
other countries of the region (see section IV.2), this 
tendency became gradually more pronounced during 
the period 1991-1993, since whereas wages grew 
in relation to the prices of the consumer shopping 
basket (although much less than productivity),11 in-
dustrial prices remained practically unchanged (influ-
enced by the fixed exchange rate), while the prices 
of services rose, and also, in consequence, nominal 
wages and the ratios between wages and industrial 
prices and wages and the exchange rate. This deterio-
ration in the relative prices of tradeable goods greatly 
slackened as from 1994, so that in that year labour 
costs increased both in terms of pesos and of dollars 
(table 1) at a rate closer to that of real wages and also 
of productivity.12 It is even argued that the devalu-
11
 J. Schvarzer (1994) questions the official figures on the 
growth of industrial production because he considers that the 
change in the domestically produced component, which went 
down in many branches of manufacturing, is not taken into ac-
count in the national accounts calculations. When the latter are 
recalculated in the light of this, the growth rate of the industrial 
GDP is 10% below the official figure for 1994. From this stand-
point, the increase in industrial productivity shown in the table 
would be overestimated. 
12
 Furthermore, in that year the reductions in the employer's 
contributions came into effect. According to Szretter (1995), this 
led to a reduction in unit wage costs (i.e., the costs which take 
account of the effect of productivity). 
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ation of the Argentine peso with respect to the Brazil-
ian Real and the devaluation of the dollar with re-
spect to other strong currencies, together with the 
improvement in the prices of the products exported 
by Argentina, were other factors which further in-
creased as from 1994 the beneficial effects on com-
petitiveness exerted by the increase in productivity 
(Kacef and Machinea, 1995). 
At all events, the mere comparison of wages in 
terms of dollars is not an adequate index of the de-
gree of competitiveness either, since, as shown in 
V 
Conclusions 
In the course of this paper it has been argued, first of 
all, that economic theory is by no means conclusive 
regarding the impact of labour regulations on com-
petitiveness, since the positions of the different 
schools of thought are contradictory in many aspects. 
Empirical studies have shown the very limited rele-
vance of the information put forward regarding these 
presumed links. This conclusion may be due partly to 
the intrinsic difficulty of singling out the effects of 
regulations as compared with other factors. 
It may be concluded from the foregoing that, 
among other things, there are various strategies open 
to the countries, so that they have more leeway for 
action that the orthodox positions usually suggest, 
since many policies aimed at improving equity do not 
necessarily involve any restrictions on competitive-
ness. A country can therefore choose its own desired 
level of social protection. Indeed, labour regulations 
are by no means identical, even in the closely inte-
grated European countries (De Castro, 1995). The in-
stitutional framework of the different countries is the 
result of a large number of historical and cultural 
factors, and the range of feasible changes is strongly 
influenced by such traditions. 
Thus, the question of how to improve com-
petitiveness goes beyond merely technical analy-
sis and develops, at least partly, into an examina-
tion of income distribution. The orthodox formula, 
which does not seem to have a sufficient concep-
tual or empirical basis, holds that there must be a 
reduction in the quality of life of workers for a 
sections II and III, it is necessary to take into account 
the differences in productivity too. In this respect, the 
FIEL study already referred to shows that in some 
sectors the differences in wages in terms of dollars 
between Argentina and other neighbouring countries 
were more than offset by the big differences in the 
product/employment ratio. 
In short, none of the known country-level studies 
have contributed substantive empirical proof of the 
negative repercussions of labour regulations on com-
petitiveness (Feldman, 1995). 
period whose duration is difficult to predict. While it 
is true that a country which must increase its trade 
relations yet has a backward productive base must 
provide firms with certain initial conditions which 
will enable them to make up for the differences in 
productivity which may exist, this formula does not 
seem to be the only one, and it is certainly not the 
most equitable or necessarily the most effective. In 
order to generate these conditions it seems perfectly 
possible to design systems of income redistribution 
which will make it an attractive proposition to make 
investments in order to compete internationally with-
out resorting to further reductions in the wages of those 
who were precisely the persons most heavily affected 
during the last years of import substitution policies. 
The question of the links between labour regula-
tions and competitiveness cannot be seen as a con-
flict between equity and efficiency. As we have tried 
to show here, it is really a question of differing eco-
nomic and legal concepts of equity and efficiency. 
The orthodox approach -at least in its most common 
form- maintains that there is one and only one way 
of optimizing efficiency and that it involves tempo-
rary sacrifices of equity. The review made here, 
however, suggests that there is broad leeway for 
choosing between various combinations of equity 
and efficiency, and their selection depends on the 
power relations of the different social actors and 
the structure of the State, rather than on infallible, 
exclusive and indubitable formulas. 
(Original: Spanish). 
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